Parallel Tensions, US and Iran and Israel and Hesbollah

As US pressures Iran, parallel tensions grow between Israel and Hezbollah

A decade of relative calm along the Israel-Lebanon border is being rattled as both Israel and Hezbollah threaten each other. The threats were provoked by the Trump administration signaling an intent to roll back the growing influence of Iran, Hezbollah’s sponsor.



The calm that has prevailed for more than a decade along the Lebanon-Israel border is being rattled by a flurry of fiery warnings from both sides that has many here concerned another war between the Jewish state and Lebanon’s Hezbollah organization may be drawing closer.

Hezbollah leader Sheikh Hassan Nasrallah has threatened to hit Israel's nuclear reactor should the Jewish state attack. Israeli officials have warned that all Lebanon will be struck if Hezbollah attacks the Israeli home front.

The prospect of a mutually destructive war unleashed on Lebanon and Israel continues to act as a deterrence, but it remains perilously vulnerable to a miscalculation that could spiral into a conflict before either side can dial it back.

"I don' think [a war] is imminent. But mistakes based on miscalculations and wrong messaging can happen," says Randa Slim, a scholar with the Washington-based Middle East Institute and an expert on Hezbollah. "Despite Nasrallah's blustery rhetoric, Hezbollah is in no position to wage this war now [and] Israel cannot afford to call Nasrallah's bluff about targeting the nuclear plant. The mutual deterrence regime that has been in place on the Israeli-Lebanese border has been beneficial to both Israel and Hezbollah and I don't think either side is ready yet to upend it."

The latest mutual threats were provoked by the new Trump administration signaling an intention to roll back the growing influence of Iran, Hezbollah’s sponsor, across the Middle East. But given the extensive influence Iran wields in Syria and Iraq and to a lesser extent in Yemen, a new US effort to dent the Islamic Republic's reach could have ramifications for the more pressing goal of defeating the self-declared Islamic State, and could incur a potent backlash against American interests from Iran-backed groups across the region.

Targeting several militant groups

On Tuesday, the Pentagon handed the White House a preliminary plan to defeat the self-declared Islamic State – which Trump has touted as a top foreign policy priority. While the proposal remains classified, some reports have suggested the recommendations include expanding the scope to other militant extremist groups operating in the Middle East, among them Al Qaeda and possibly Hezbollah.

Gen. Joseph Dunford, the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, hinted at a broader approach to trans-regional threats in the Middle East in comments made last week in which he described Iran as a “malign influence” in the region.

“They [the Iranians] have got a very aggressive proxy war,” he told an audience at the Brookings Institution in Washington on Friday. “We see that in Yemen. We see their influence in Syria. We see their malign influence in Lebanon, as well as in Iraq and the rest of the region.”

The renewed focus on Iranian activity in the Middle East has triggered some tough rhetoric from both sides of the Lebanon-Israel border.

Nasrallah sought to bolster his organization's deterrence capabilities by threatening to target Israel's nuclear reactor in Dimona, in southern Israel, and the ammonia storage facilities in Haifa in the north, should Israel attack Lebanon. While Hezbollah was not seeking a conflict with the Jewish state, Nasrallah told Iran's Channel 1 News, "Israel should think a million times before waging any war with Lebanon."

In return, Israeli Defense Minister Avigdor Lieberman dismissed Nasrallah’s warnings, saying “a dog that barks doesn’t bite.” Another Israeli minister said that if Hezbollah attacks, “all of Lebanon will be hit.”

A war to dwarf the last one

Despite the posturing, both sides understand that the scale of the next war will completely dwarf the last one in 2006. That grim reality has helped ensure 10 years of relative tranquillity along the Lebanon-Israel border.

Still, the risk of a miscalculation by one side or the other could quickly turn the calm into violence. Israel has pushed the envelope more than Hezbollah in recent years, with assassinations of Hezbollah personnel and airstrikes in Syria against suspected arms depots or convoys destined for the Lebanese group. Hezbollah has been careful to tailor its reprisal operations to deliver a slap to Israel, but not be hard enough to upset the “balance of terror.”

In the past decade, the Lebanese group has expanded massively in terms of manpower, weaponry, and experience. Since 2012, Hezbollah fighters have learned a new set of battlefield skills in Syria, where the group has intervened to defend the regime of President Bashar al-Assad.

Hezbollah, Arabic for the Party of God, has become too small a name for what the organization has evolved into, says a veteran Hezbollah commander who has served multiple tours in Syria.

“We should be called Jaysh al-Allah,” the Army of God, he says.

With the Assad regime lately gaining an upper hand in the military struggle, some in Israel fret that Hezbollah might turn its attention back to its primary enemy.

“The fact that the organization is identified with the ‘winning side’ will only give it more confidence in its abilities to shift the fighting toward its main enemy – Israel,” wrote Giora Eiland, a former Israeli national security adviser, in the Yedioth Ahranot daily last week.

Among the tactics practiced by Hezbollah in Syria is offensive operations, hardening the view that in the next war the cadres will cross the border into northern Israel to conduct ambushes and raids, a development first revealed by The Christian Science Monitor in April 2008 and subsequently alluded to by Nasrallah in a speech three years later. The Israeli military is taking the threat seriously, and in recent months has bolstered its defenses along the northern border with Lebanon, placing concrete blocks at potential breach points and even excavating the sides of valleys adjacent to the frontier into un-climbable sheer cliffs.

Although much of the attention on Hezbollah in recent years has been on the organization’s activities in Syria, it has not abandoned the Israel front.

Many of its top fighters, especially anti-tank missile teams and the rocket units, have stayed in Lebanon rather than go to Syria. For the past two months, plain-clothed Hezbollah units have been conducting a thorough but low-key survey of the Lebanon-Israel border, taking extensive measurements of adjacent terrain, including slope gradients, and photographing Israel’s own new defenses on the other side of the fence, according to sources based in south Lebanon. The survey, which is part operational planning and part psychological needling of Israeli troops watching from the other side of the fence, underlines that Hezbollah’s anti-Israel activities have not slowed despite the involvement with Syria.

#RIPPaxAmericana ?? #OyVeyDonaldTrump in Bed ?or Against? the Russian -Iranian Alliance in the Syria , Lebanon and the rest of Middle East

Can Trump Break Up the Russian-Iranian Alliance?


One of the president's biggest early foreign policy tests will be navigating the aftermath of the nuclear deal, which brought the Islamic Republic even further into Russia's orbit.

Russia and Iran are currently engaged in unprecedented cooperation. Never in 500 years has the leadership of the two countries been so close. Despite deeply rooted mistrust and a long history as rivals, a number of common interests have brought Russia and Iran together. First among them is the mutual geostrategic goal of zero-sum opposition to the West, especially the United States.

Russian-Iranian cooperation may be short-lived. But in the meantime it can inflict lasting damage to U.S. interests. It is going to be difficult to drive a wedge between Russia and Iran in the short-term, but there are certain things the new Trump administration could do to that end.

To understand the close ties between Russia and Iran, it's important to understand the complicated history between the two countries.

The Grand Duchy of Muscovy, the precursor of the modern Russian state, and Iran, then called Persia, opened official relations in 1521. Trade was the main reason for the relationship; both countries looked down on each other as inferior, and thus gave little thought to expanding ties. Tsarist Russia, which succeeded the Muscovy in 1547, and then the Russian Empire that Peter the Great proclaimed in 1721, soon began to expand south and southeast into Central Asia and the Caucasus. This is when Russian and Persian interests first clashed. In 1796, Catherine the Great sent troops into the Iranian North Caucasus, and only her death that year may have prevented a full-scale Russian invasion.

In the 19th century, Russia and Iran fought two wars, in 1804-1813 and 1826-1828. Iran lost both and ceded to Russia parts of what are now Azerbaijan, Georgia, Armenia, and Turkmenistan. The wars took a serious financial toll on Iran and anti-Russian sentiment rose on both religious grounds and resentment of the high cost of the war effort. In February 1829, a mob murdered Russian ambassador Alexander Griboyedov with his staff in Tehran. Griboyedov had helped negotiate the Treaty of Turkmenchay, which ended the war in 1828 on what the Iranians saw as humiliating terms. A Russian envoy would not be murdered by foreign nationals in a foreign country again until 2016.

Despite these tensions, commercial and political interests brought Russia and Iran together in the early 1900s. The Kremlin wanted to pull Iran into its sphere of influence and the Iranian shah needed money, which he began borrowing from Russia either at exorbitant rates or with political strings attached. The Iranian public, of course, bore the cost. This opened a rift between the Iranian government's attitude toward Russia and that of its people -- one that remains to this day.

After the 1917 Bolshevik Revolution, Soviet forces sponsored separatist movements in Iranian territory, first in the northern Iranian province of Gilan on the Caspian Sea and later in both Iranian Azerbaijan and Kurdistan. In 1946, Soviet leader Josef Stalin sparked the first real crisis of the Cold War when he briefly refused to withdraw the Red Army from Iran in 1946. To this day, Iranians speak resentfully of the Soviet occupation. Iranian revolutionary leader Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini disdained both the U.S. and the Soviet Union. His defining slogan was "Neither East nor West but Islamic Republic."

While the Iranian public remained distrustful of Russia, with the end of the Iran-Iraq War in 1988, as well as Khomeini's death and the Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan in 1989, some Iranian officials sought to improve ties with Moscow on pragmatic grounds. Ayatollah Ali Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani even traveled to Moscow. But the Kremlin worried that Iran might export its radical ideology to Russia's large Muslim population or foment unrest in the Caucasus and Central Asia in order to influence Moscow -- after all, this is the traditional Kremlin approach. Yet Tehran sided with Moscow during Chechnya's separatist struggles in the early 1990s. Iran also helped Moscow end Tajikistan's 1992-1997 civil war. By the end of the '90s, despite remaining differences, Russia had emerged as Iran's main conventional arms supplier and began assisting in its nuclear program.

When Vladimir Putin rose to power in Russia in 2000, he began the process of returning to the Middle East. To do so, he worked with everyone in the region, friend and foe alike. Russia's relationship with Iran was part of this effort.

The strategy grew out of Putin's antagonism toward the West and its democratic values. He viewed Russia's foreign policy as a zero-sum game against the West and acted accordingly. He had several reasons to pursue improved ties with Iran, but his desire to reduce Western influence and pull Iran closer to Russia overrode all others. As Prof. Mark Katz of George Mason University wrote, Putin worried that then-Iranian President Mohammad Khatami's "dialogue of civilizations" would bring Iran closer to the U.S. -- and thus out of Russia's sphere of influence.

In October 2000, soon after taking office, Putin publicly repealed the 1995 Gore-Chernomyrdin pact, which limited Russia's sale of conventional arms to Iran. Press reports indicated that in practice the agreement gave Russia "a free pass to sell conventional weapons to Iran" until 1999, but the public cancellation of the deal sent a message that Putin wanted closer cooperation with the Islamic Republic.

Putin also sought to improve ties with Iran for economic reasons. Iran was a lucrative market for Russia's military and the arms trade and nuclear cooperation continued to expand. In addition, the two countries shared a strong opposition to Sunni Islamism. A tough stance against terrorism helped propel Putin into power in March 2000 after a series of apartment bombings shook Moscow and several other cities in September 1999. Putin immediately blamed the Chechens and declared a second war on Chechnya, though much evidence suggests Putin and his main intelligence service, the FSB, may have orchestrated the attacks. In any case, Moscow's human rights abuses in the first Chechen war had already transformed the secular Chechen separatist cause into a radical Islamist one.

The majority of Russia's Muslims are Sunni and countering Sunni extremism was among Putin's official policies from the very beginning. Shia Iran shared this concern. Indeed, Russian experts and officials claim that Iran is a potentially "secular" force that can help counter Sunni Islamism. This has led to a double standard on Sunni versus Shia terrorism. In February 2003, for example, Russia's Supreme Court declared the Sunni Muslim Brotherhood a terrorist organization, while Shia Hezbollah received no such designation. Though in practice Putin was just as willing to work with Sunni Islamists as anyone else, he took a different stance domestically.

Of course, difficulties remained in the Russia-Iran relationship. Since 2006, Moscow has sought to dilute sanctions against Iran. For its part, Iran would have preferred Russia did not support sanctions at all. Tehran also felt snubbed when, under pressure from the U.S. and Israel, Moscow froze the sale of S-300 air defense missiles to Iran in 2010.

In 2013, however, Russian-Iranian cooperation rose to an entirely new level as the two countries' political interests converged more than ever before.

In 2012, Putin began a third presidential term amidst massive protests against him and his United Russia party. Putin launched a domestic crackdown and blamed the U.S. State Department for "giving a signal" to protestors to take to the streets. He could not even fathom the possibility that people could protest independently. Fear that domestic protest can break out anywhere, anytime now guides much of his domestic policy, which goes hand-in-hand with his foreign policy. In Russia the line between the two is blurred to a degree that is hard to imagine in the West.

Putin believes that the West is behind all protests in the post-Soviet sphere and the Middle East, and that he is next. This is one of the main reasons why he has supported the Assad regime in Syria at all costs. This in turn brought Moscow especially close to Tehran. Putin believes he is in a stronger position to confront the West in the Middle East if he is allied with Iran.

Russia also emerged as a strong voice in the P5+1 group that negotiated the nuclear deal with Iran, especially in the context of Western retreat from the Middle East. Putin pursued his own self-interest in regard to the talks: A deal with Iran would open more possibilities for cooperation. On the one hand, Russia would prefer a non-nuclear Iran; it hardly needed convincing to participate in talks to curb Tehran's nuclear program. On the other hand, Moscow felt less threatened by the program than the West, and ultimately puts its desire to counter the West above all. It may make little sense from a Western perspective, but Moscow often ignores real threats and elevates imaginary ones -- hence its obsession with a perceived threat from NATO.

Russia and Iran also shared a concern about the resurgence of the Taliban in Afghanistan following President Obama's plans to draw down U.S. troops by 2014. Ironically, Putin wanted the U.S. to remain in Afghanistan more than the U.S. wanted to -- albeit on Putin's terms. Russia and Iran were impacted by narcotrafficking coming out of Afghanistan and viewed the Taliban, which is traditionally both anti-Shia and anti-Russian, as a potential enemy.

In spring 2013, according to Russian sources, Russian and Iranian officials discussed the idea of Tehran joining the Moscow-led Eurasian Customs Union at a seminar in Tehran titled "Iran and Regional Cooperation in Eurasia." Iranian Foreign Minister Ali Akbar Salehi attended the event and reportedly spoke of Iran's usefulness to the development and expansion of Eurasianism -- Putin's alternative vision to Western liberalism. The Customs Union in particular, and the Eurasian Economic Union that followed it in 2014, are part of Putin's effort to counterbalance the European Union. This may have been just talk, but that the conversation took place at all is significant. Putin never offered to allow any Arab country to join the Customs Union, and Iran was never part of the Soviet Union, as were the other member countries.

In March 2014, Moscow annexed Crimea and began destabilizing activities in Eastern Ukraine. The U.S. and Europe imposed sanctions on Russia in response. U.S.-Russian relations plunged to the lowest levels since the Cold War, intensifying Putin's need for anti-Western allies. Iran fit that role perfectly. That America's allies are traditionally Sunni only adds to Iran's appeal.

Russian Defense Minister Sergei Shoigu visited Iran in January 2015 and Putin visited in November -- the first such visits in at least a decade. After they met, Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei praised Putin for "neutralizing Washington's plots." Putin again brought up the issue of Iranian cooperation with the Customs Union, offered a $5 billion line of credit, and discussed expansion of bilateral trade. He also highlighted Iran's positive role as a "trustworthy and reliable ally," demonstrating once again his true priority of pulling Iran into his sphere of influence. Indeed, Russian Middle East expert Georgiy Mirsky wrote in his blog on the liberal website Echo Moskvy, "Several years ago, I heard from the lips of one MIA [Ministry of Internal Affairs] employee such reasoning: 'For us, a pro-American Iran is worse than a nuclear Iran.'" Putin and Iranian President Hassan Rouhani have met several times since 2015, as have their ministers and aides. Subsequent high-level meetings followed and are now almost routine.

As negotiations on the nuclear deal gained traction, the Kremlin highlighted Russia's indispensable role in them. When the agreement was signed in July 2015, Putin praised the deal and emphasized Russia's participation in the process, while the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs tweeted that the accord was "based on the approach articulated by President Vladimir Putin." The ink had barely dried on the accord when Putin lifted the freeze on the S-300 sale and deliveries began in April 2015, despite Israel's concerns. In June 2016, Putin called for Iran's admission to the Shanghai Cooperation Organization, something -- just as with the Customs Union -- he had never done for any Arab state.

In August 2016, Moscow took the world -- and many in Iran -- by surprise when it reportedly used Iran's Hamadan airbase to bomb targets in Syria. The last time a foreign power had based itself in Iran was during World War II. Russian media was awash with praise for Russia-Iran anti-terrorism cooperation. In the context of public outrage in Iran, Iranian Defense Minister Hossein Dehghan accused Moscow of "ungentlemanly" behavior for publicizing its use of the base. Nonetheless, Iranian Parliament Speaker Ali Larijani said only days afterwards that "The flights [of Russian warplanes] haven't been suspended. Iran and Russia are allies in the fight against terrorism," though the Hamedan air base, he claimed, was only "used for refueling."

The following month, Putin said that it would be "just" if Iran reached pre-sanctions level of oil production. In November, he began discussing a $10 billion arms deal. In late December, discussions on Iranian admission to the Customs Union continued. A number of Russian sources reported that Iran hopes to move closer to the Union and benefit from free trade with its members. In the same month, Rouhani travelled to Armenia -- a Customs Union member -- ostensibly to improve ties, and signed a number of agreements. It was Rouhani's first visit to Armenia as president. The traditionally more liberal-oriented press outlet Nezavisimaya Gazeta suggested that Armenia might tie Iran to the Customs Union. While it remains unclear whether this will happen, it is significant that the issue remains on the table.

When it comes to the Iranian view of Russia, sources report that the two countries agree on terrorism-related issues and Iran sees Russia's policies in Syria as "wise." Recently, Russian press outlet Izvestiya wrote that, reflecting on the past year, it was Russia that always spoke out for lifting sanctions and maintained dialogue with Tehran. Iranian cinema made its way into Europe, the article claims, because it was widely shown at Russian film festivals. The article concludes, "Dialogue between the two countries has not been interrupted even for a minute. And it is this fact that gives reason for optimism -- whatever the complexities may be, Russia and Iran will find a reason for friendship."

At the moment, it is going to be difficult to drive a wedge between Russia and Iran. Too many interests hold them together and they are likely to continue to put historical mistrust aside even as Tehran's persistent and historically-justified fears that Moscow will throw Iran under the bus continue to undermine the relationship.

From Moscow's perspective, the U.S. has been and will continue to be an enemy, no matter how hard any U.S. president tries to improve relations. Putin needs the U.S. as an enemy to justify domestic problems at home and he sees the current geopolitical order, anchored by the U.S., as disadvantaging him. Nothing short of a rearrangement of that order will satisfy Putin. Nobel Prize-winning author and journalist Svetlana Alexievich observed in October 2015 that Russians "are people of war. We don't have any other history. Either we were preparing for war or we were fighting one. And so all of this militarism has pushed all of our psychological buttons at once." Putin needs allies who share this worldview.

President Trump expressed two contradictory policies during his campaign: being tough on Iran and improving relations with Russia. These two goals are incompatible because Putin wants a partnership with Trump in Syria, but Syria is where Putin is most closely allied with Iran. In order to push Iran and Russia apart, Trump needs to resolve this contradiction. The recent Syria peace talks in Kazakhstan only brought Russia and Iran closer together, if anything, given their pledge to fight "jointly" against ISIS and al-Qaeda-affiliated Jabhat Fateh al-Sham. This development will also make it even more difficult for Trump to ally with Russia on Syria.

So far, Putin has succeeded in balancing Israeli and Sunni interests with its growing relationship with Iran. But it is unclear how long Putin can sustain this policy. Certainly, Putin did not hesitate to discount Israel's interests when it came to selling S-300 weapons to Iran. Indeed, it is not in Israel's interest for Putin to continue supporting Bashar al-Assad and thereby expand Iran's influence in the Middle East. The Trump administration could encourage and support U.S. allies like Israel in order to make it more difficult for Putin to maintain his balance of good relations with all sides. It should also step up security cooperation with its allies to demonstrate that it is still committed to the region.

In the long term, Russia and Iran diverge somewhat on Syria. Iran perceives Syria as within its sphere of influence, which is not very different from how Putin views the former Soviet Union countries that he does not consider real states. Iran is interested in exacerbating sectarian divisions in Syria so that the Assad regime becomes an Iranian client-state with no independent decision-making. Iran is also closer to Assad himself than Putin, who simply wants Assad or someone else like him to ensure his interests in Syria. He cares more about how he can leverage Syria in his relations with the West than Syria itself. At the same time, Putin also increasingly perceives the Middle East as falling within the Russian sphere of influence, albeit differently than Iran. Historically, Moscow always looked for buffer zones out of its sense of insecurity, and this is precisely how it feels now.

The Trump administration could emphasize to Putin that Russian and Iranian interests in Syria are bound to clash in the future, and therefore an alliance with Iran can only go so far. But most of all, the U.S. needs to be present in the region and regain its leadership position. Putin preys on weakness and has perceived the U.S. as weak for years. He stepped into a vacuum in the Middle East, especially in Syria, that was created by America's absence. By taking an active role in the region, the U.S. would limit Putin's influence, including his alliance with Iran.

#OyVey Donald Trumps huge bear hug for Zion .....day two of his Presidency discussion on moving the US Embassy to Jerusalem!?!!! Zion holds its breath but hey it is nice getting a that warm hug with the anticipation of many, many more. .

There was something unsettling though, even hypocritical, with the way the Left reacted to Friedman’s appointment.





On September 9, 2003, at about 11:20 p.m., a Palestinian suicide bomber walked into Café Hillel on Emek Refaim Street in Jerusalem and blew himself up.

Seven Israelis were killed, including Dr. David Applebaum, head of the Shaare Zedek emergency room, and his daughter Nava. The two had gone out for one last cup of coffee before Nava’s wedding scheduled for the following day.

David Friedman, the man Donald Trump named last week as the new US ambassador to Israel, was in Jerusalem. Nava, 20 at the time, was supposed to marry a cousin of Friedman’s wife, and they had flown in from New York to join the celebrations.

Instead of a wedding, the guests ended up attending a double funeral for a father and daughter buried side-by-side in Jerusalem’s Har Hamenuhot cemetery.

Later that day, Friedman went for a walk through city.

Crossing the upscale neighborhood of Talbiyeh, he looked up at a skeleton of a building in the initial stages of construction and called the contractor’s number, posted on the sign outside.

The two made up to meet later that day.

They walked through the unfinished building until they got to one of the top floors. Friedman asked how much the floor would cost. The contractor threw out a sum and right there Friedman accepted. For the contractor, it was unreal: 2003 was the height of the second intifada, terrorist attacks were a regular occurrence throughout Israel, and real estate prices were at an all-time low. To find a customer willing to buy an entire floor was a dream come true.

But that is David Friedman. While media attention over the last week focused on the controversial and inappropriate comments he made about J Street, we shouldn’t forget the basics: Friedman is a proud Jew, a huge supporter of Israel, an American patriot, and most importantly when it comes to his new posting, a close confidant of the man who on January 20 will become the leader of the Free World.

This does not mean we should condone everything he says or writes. US ambassadors to Israel should find a way to work with all Jewish-American organizations, even those with whom they might have personal and fundamental disagreements, like J Street.

But we should put this into perspective. What Friedman wrote was in his capacity as a private citizen. Now that he is the ambassador-designate, he likely knows that his personal politics will need to be cast aside. He no longer represents himself. Like all ambassadors, he serves at the pleasure of the president. He represents the president’s views and implements the president’s policies.

There was something unsettling though, even hypocritical, with the way the Left reacted to Friedman’s appointment. For The New York Times, it seemed like the end of days. According to the paper, Friedman’s appointment will “heighten regional tensions and undermine American leadership.”

Seriously? Friedman will undermine American leadership? Has the Times forgotten that President Barack Obama already undermined his own leadership in the Middle East, when he set red lines in Syria which disappeared the moment they were not enforced after being flagrantly violated? Just look at whom the regional Sunni states turn to today when they are in trouble – not to the US, but to Israel. Considering the growing Russian presence in the region and the lack of US involvement, I’m not sure just how much more that leadership can be undermined.

If anything, Friedman, as the representative of a newly- elected president, has the opportunity to rebuild America’s leadership and standing in the region. It won’t be an easy task considering the damage that has been done, and the general suspicion of Trump. But it is doable.

The hypocrisy was not limited to the press – it found its way into Israeli politics as well. Numerous Israeli lawmakers on the Left railed against the appointment. Meretz Chairwoman Zehava Gal-On, for example, said that Friedman “is a catastrophic choice” to serve as ambassador.

Has Gal-On forgotten that Friedman was nominated to his post by the president-elect of the United States? Does she not realize that as a member of the Knesset, her comment undermines Israel’s relationship with America? This is an even bigger hypocrisy considering the same Gal-On slammed Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu a year ago for addressing Congress to prevent the Iran deal. The prime minister, she said then, was harming US-Israeli relations. So basically, according to Gal-On, Netanyahu’s speech to Congress harmed ties with the US, but calling the man selected by the incoming president to serve as his official envoy to Israel a “catastrophe” doesn’t? Friedman can take some comfort knowing that this is not the first time the Left in America and Israel have opposed an ambassadorial appointment.

In 2013, when Netanyahu tapped Ron Dermer – his longtime aid – as the Israeli ambassador to the US, some on the Left viewed it as a slap to President Barack Obama’s face due to Dermer’s alleged support of Mitt Romney in the elections the year before. Peter Beinart, for example, wrote that Dermer is an unprofessional diplomat “who behaves in such undiplomatic fashion.”

In the end Washington did not fight the appointment, for the most part since the administration understood that Dermer, as ambassador, came with a valuable asset – a direct line of communication with the prime minister. Dermer was Netanyahu’s close confidant and someone who always had the prime minister’s ear (Dermer, by the way, had planned to return to Israel after the elections if Hillary Clinton had won. He is now staying in Washington with no end to his term in sight).

The same seems to be the case with Friedman. He is not a politician, nor a diplomat, but he comes from Trump’s inner circle. They have been friends for over 15 years. Friedman was one of the two witnesses who signed the ketuba of Ivanka Trump and Jared Kushner, and when Ivanka came to Israel a few years ago to look at investment opportunities, Friedman was by her side.

This closeness is an advantage for an ambassador, but even more so for the country where he or she is stationed. It means that when a message is given to an ambassador, it goes directly to that country’s leadership without intermediaries.

Considering the challenges the US and Israel are facing in the region, this kind of ambassador will likely come in handy.


***Will Donald Trump really move the US Embassy from Tel Aviv to Jerusalem? Based on media attention, this question seems to be at the heart of today’s US-Israeli alliance. It shouldn’t be.

Defense Minister Avigdor Liberman was right when he said earlier this month that it would be a mistake to focus everything on the embassy, especially considering the more pressing issues the two countries need to tackle – Iran, the ongoing war in Syria, deadlock in the peace process with the Palestinians, and regional stability.

The fact that the embassy has not been in Jerusalem until now is a travesty. Jerusalem has been the Jewish people’s capital for millennia, and even considering diplomatic circumstances, there was never a reason the US Embassy couldn’t be in the western side of the city, the part that has been under Israeli control since the state was established in 1948.

Nevertheless, I question the practical gain from having it moved to Jerusalem. It’s true that it would be recognizing Israeli sovereignty over its capital, but not much more. Other countries are unlikely to follow suit – a number of ambassadors from Europe and Asia have told me so in recent weeks - and while it might seem to reflect a significant change in US-Israeli relations, it might mean the opposite.

Here is one scenario: Imagine Jordan’s King Abdullah calls Trump and explains to him that if the embassy is moved to Jerusalem, the streets of Amman will be swept up in riots that will threaten his regime’s survival. Seventy percent of Jordanians are Palestinian, and there are already hundreds of thousands of Syrian refugees in the country. The economic challenges Abdullah faces, combined with the threats from radical extremists, are daunting. He is one of the last American and Israeli allies still standing in the Middle East. Risking his regime needs to be handled delicately.

Here is another scenario: Trump receives a call from King Salman of Saudi Arabia, who reminds the president that to successfully defeat ISIS, it would be a mistake to empower radicals by moving the embassy to Jerusalem. Salman might then call Rex Tillerson, the new secretary of state, who has strong ties in the Gulf from his nearly 40-year career at ExxonMobil.

What will Trump and Tillerson do then? Your guess is as good as mine.

I am not questioning Trump’s position on Israel. All indications are that he strongly supports the country. But when considering realpolitik, moving the embassy should not be the litmus test for whether someone supports the Jewish state or not. There are bigger issues that need to be dealt with and other considerations that need to be taken into account.

There is also a completely different possibility: Trump might be using the embassy and Friedman’s appointment to give Israel a bear hug, before he starts pressuring Netanyahu to make a deal with the Palestinians. He will first shower them with love and then lay on the pressure.

This would be the exact opposite of what happened with Obama. In 2009, Obama gave his famous Cairo speech and made a clear decision to create daylight between Israel and the US. When he then began pressuring Israel, it didn’t take much to turn Israeli and American-Jewish public opinion against him because of the Cairo speech.

The possibility that Trump might be thinking this far ahead is unlikely, even though he has said numerous times since winning the election that he wants to be the president who brokers the “ultimate deal” between Israel and the Palestinians.

Nevertheless, Israelis need to consider all possible scenarios.

One thing is for sure: in the meantime it’s nice to be getting a warm bear hug.

Shutting down Hezbollah Finances

TARGETING HEZBOLLAH'S HOME-FRONT FINANCES

A law passed in late 2015, known as HIFPA, has successfully intensified pressure against the Lebanon-based militant group.
During a June 26 televised address, Hassan Nasrallah, secretary-general of the Lebanese Shiite militia Hezbollah, made the stunning admission that his organization's "budget, its income, its expenses, everything it eats and drinks, its weapons and rockets, are from the Islamic Republic of Iran." The statement was unprecedented -- but it was also untrue. In addition to substantial Iranian support, Hezbollah has for decades helped fund its terrorist and social service initiatives through a diverse portfolio of commercial activities. The timing of Nasrallah's spurious revelation was no coincidence: on May 3, the Banque du Liban (BdL), Lebanon's central bank -- in compliance with new U.S. legislation -- issued a circular ordering banks to close accounts belonging to individuals and institutions associated with the organization. Hundreds of such Hezbollah-linked accounts have since been closed, according to BdL, threatening the militia's social support network and commercial interests. It is widely believed that in response to these financial pressures, Hezbollah detonated a bomb on June 12 outside the headquarters of Blom Bank in central Beirut, injuring two and substantially damaging the bank's offices.

BACKGROUND

The Hezbollah International Financing Prevention Act (HIFPA), which was signed into law in mid-December 2015, targets financial institutions found to knowingly facilitate a significant transaction on behalf of Hezbollah or anyone affiliated with or acting on its behalf. Similar to authorities adopted vis-à-vis Iran prior to the nuclear deal, HIFPA empowers the U.S. Treasury Department to cut off such institutions from accessing the U.S. financial system. As part of the law's implementation, in March, the Treasury published a list of close to one hundred entities globally already subject to domestic asset blocking due to their affiliation with Hezbollah. Implementing regulations published in April also limited the definition of Hezbollah under the law to the organization itself and the hundred or so previously designated affiliates.

BdL's circular, issued May 3, builds on Basic Circular 126 of 2012, which called on Lebanese financial institutions to "deal with [foreign correspondents] in conformity with the laws, regulations, procedures, sanctions and restrictions adopted...by the sovereign authorities in the correspondents' home countries." Beyond reminding banks of Basic Circular 126, the May 3 circular mandates that banks report account closures to the Special Investigation Commission, or SIC, Lebanon's Financial Intelligence Unit. The May 3 circular itself does not indicate that banks need BdL approval to close accounts. Still, some Lebanese bankers whisper that the BdL is weighing in to prevent account closures.

While the U.S. regulations present a fairly high bar for action against foreign banks, press reporting and anecdotal accounts claim that Lebanese banks are closing scores of accounts for undesignated individuals, including Hezbollah-affiliated hospitals, members of parliament, and even family members. Western banks have adopted no-tolerance policies with regard to foreign correspondents in the wake of large sanctions-related enforcement actions in recent years. With 55 percent of Lebanese trade conducted in dollars, Lebanese banks would likely be unable to operate if cut off from dollar clearing, either as a result of an ultracautious New York bank or if "made an example of" by U.S. officials.
PRESSURE ON LEBANON

Even before implementation of the HIFPA, Lebanon's economy was facing severe challenges. Since 2011, spillover from the war in Syria has undermined Lebanese commerce, slowed building, and spooked would-be tourists, retarding growth. In 2015, according to the World Bank, Lebanon's real GDP growth slowed to 1.5 percent. The arrival of 1.5 million Syrian refugees -- 25 percent of the state's current population -- has also proven costly, both financially and in terms of social dislocation. Making matters worse, Hezbollah's deployment of troops to Syria in support of the nominally Shiite Alawite Assad regime has deepened sectarian tensions between Lebanon's Sunnis and Shiites, hamstringing the government's already limited ability to make difficult economic and political decisions, and -- for the past two years -- parliament's capacity to elect a president.

Prospects for Lebanon's economy worsened in February, after the Hezbollah-aligned Lebanese foreign minister, Gebran Bassil, abstained from a nearly unanimous Arab League resolution condemning Iran for complicity in the January 3 sacking of the Saudi embassy in Tehran and consulate in Mashhad. In the aftermath of Bassil's nonvote, Saudi Arabia canceled a $3 billion grant to the Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF) and a $1 billion donation to the Internal Security Forces, and threatened to withdraw its deposits from BdL. These steps were the latest in a series of Saudi actions against Lebanon, including an official advisory against travel there, a move that could further damage hopes for a decent tourist season this summer.

PRESSURE ON HEZBOLLAH

In recent years, a series of U.S. actions has constrained Hezbollah's financial operations, but the pressure has been increased by HIFPA. Today, according to Acting Treasury Undersecretary Adam Szubin, the organization is in "its worst financial shape in decades." While it's difficult to assess with certainty the organization's financial health, the U.S. Treasury has engaged in a multiyear effort to target Hezbollah business interests used both to generate revenue and provide commercial cover for illicit activities.

Last July, Nasrallah denied that Hezbollah profited from commercial activity and condemned U.S. sanctions for undermining financial stability in Lebanon. His remarks followed a number of new sanctions actions against Hezbollah highlighting its use of commercial cover, including the June 2015 designation of Adham Tabaja and his al-Inmaa Engineering and Contracting group, which had been used to "obtain oil and construction development projects in Iraq that provide both financial support and organizational infrastructure to Hizballah." In February, the U.S. Drug Enforcement Administration, in cooperation with Interpol, announced a number of arrests associated with what law enforcement called Hezbollah's Business Affairs Component, which according to U.S. officials operates under the control of Tabaja and senior Hezbollah official Abdallah Safieddine and was responsible for the movement of large quantities of cocaine in the United States and Europe.

SALAMEH ON THE ROPES?

At the center of the controversy over Lebanon's new banking practices is Riad Salameh, who has served for the last twenty-three years as the Central Bank governor. Salameh, who at one time worked for Merrill Lynch, has a distinguished record at the bank, adeptly managing fiscal policy in a state plagued with profound sectarian divisions, a stultifying former Syrian military occupation, routine political assassinations, and periodic but intense wars between Hezbollah and Israel. Through it all, Salameh demonstrated a steady and prescient hand, increasing foreign reserves from $300 million in 1993 to nearly $37 billion today. Indeed, Salameh was instrumental in helping insulate Lebanon from the 2008 global financial meltdown by issuing -- years earlier -- a bank circular prohibiting local banks from subscribing to subprime mortgage products. Earlier this year, based on his record, which has benefited Lebanon's Sunnis, Shiites, and Christians alike, Salameh was mentioned as a possible candidate for the presidency.

In his role as governor, and under pressure from U.S. authorities, Salameh in recent years occasionally oversaw the closure of Hezbollah bank accounts. Understanding this was part of doing business, Hezbollah appeared to harbor little animus toward Salameh for these measures. Since HIFPA, however, Hezbollah and its allies have been overtly attacking Salameh in the media. In mid-May, Hezbollah parliament member Hassan Fadallah accused Salameh of being overzealous in his implementation of the regulations, describing him as "more American than the Americans." More recently, just a day before the Blom Bank bombing, Iran's Fars News Agency accused the Lebanese Central Bank, under Salameh, of perpetrating "economic and ethnic cleansing" by implementing the banking sanctions.

Instead of complying with U.S. "aggression," according to the pro-Hezbollah daily al-Akhbar, Hezbollah wants Salameh to "defend Lebanese sovereignty," abolish the May 3 circular, and resume his understanding with Hezbollah to apply U.S. regulations only to dollar -- and not Lebanese lira -- accounts. While in recent days the ad hominem attacks on the governor have diminished slightly, pressures on Salameh are likely to persist.

CONCLUSION

The Blom Bank bombing was an unambiguous warning from Hezbollah: should Beirut continue to focus on Hezbollah assets, the militia could decide to more violently target Lebanon's financial sector, undermining a key node of stability in the state. Notwithstanding Hezbollah pressure, however, it is not clear that the BdL could encourage Lebanese banks to take a more laissez faire approach to Hezbollah accounts. The costs of noncompliance are so severe that few of Lebanon's large, profitable banks -- and very few international financial institutions -- are willing to take the risk.

Facing increased financial pressures, it is possible that Hezbollah could lash out a la 2008, when the militia invaded Beirut, killing a hundred, to reverse unfavorable government edicts. More likely, though, the organization will find temporary, albeit cumbersome, work-arounds. Still, the Treasury measures will continue to greatly complicate the organization's finances. Since 2001, Washington has been narrowly focused on targeting al-Qaeda and more recently on the Islamic State. HIFPA represents a welcome U.S. initiative to target, at least financially, the "A team" of terrorism.